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Abstract
An important concern for many Cloud customers is data
confidentiality. Of particular concern are potential data leaks
via side channels, which arise when mutually untrusted parties
contend on resources such as CPUs, caches, and networks.
In this paper, we present a principled solution for mitigat-
ing side channels that arise from shared network links. Our
solution, Pacer, shapes the outbound traffic of a Cloud ten-
ant to make it independent of the tenant’s secrets by design.
At the same time, Pacer permits traffic variations based on
public (non-secret) aspects of the tenants’ computation, thus
enabling efficient sharing of network resources. Implementing
Pacer requires modest changes to the guest OS and the hosting
hypervisor, and only minimal changes to guest applications.
Experiments show that Pacer allows guests to protect their se-
crets with overhead close to the minimum possible considering
the guest’s conditional traffic distribution given public infor-
mation. For instance, Pacer can hide a requested Wiktionary
document in one of two size clusters at an average throughput
and bandwidth overhead of 6.8% and 150%, respectively.
1. Introduction
Clouds provide elastic computing, communication, and stor-
age to customers large and small on a pay-per-use basis. An
important requirement for many customers is the confidential-
ity of Cloud-hosted data and computation. Trusted execution
environments (TEEs), such as those offered by Azure confi-
dential computing [1], provide hardware-based isolation under
a strong threat model. However, a TEE alone does not prevent
leakage via side channels.
Side channels arise when mutually distrusting parties share
hardware resources. Such sharing is in the very nature of
public Clouds; for instance, CPUs, cores, caches and memory
buses may be shared among otherwise isolated tenants co-
located on the same server in an infrastructure-as-a-service
(IaaS) Cloud. All of these shared resources have been exploited
as side channels [69, 50, 47, 9, 49, 46, 70, 41, 32, 71, 5, 25,
59, 73, 7, 26, 56]. Even if tenants rent dedicated CPU sockets
and use memory within their local NUMA domain only, they
still share a network link, which can leak a tenant’s secrets [6].
This attack works even if adversary and victim are hosted on
separate servers but share a bottleneck link (see §2).
In contrast to side channels via shared microarchitectural
state and memory, side channels that arise via shared net-
work links have not received much attention, particularly in
the context of Cloud computing. In this work, we present
a system called Pacer, which focuses on mitigating network
side channels in the Cloud. Specifically, we mitigate leaks
of a tenant VM’s sensitive data to an adversary that can co-
locate VMs with the tenant’s VM on the same server, rack or
the datacenter, and can perform fine-grained network delay
measurements. Pacer does not protect tenants against side
channels via shared micro-architectural state and memory hier-
archy, but these may be mitigated by renting dedicated servers
or dedicated sockets on Cloud hosts. Moreover, Pacer can be
easily combined with existing solutions that mitigate these
other side channels [61, 11].
A natural approach to mitigating network side-channel at-
tacks is to weaken the correlation between the victim’s traffic
shape and its secrets by adding noise to the adversary’s obser-
vations [35]. However, relying on noise alone is risky, because
we cannot safely assume that the noise is sufficient in level
and entropy at all times to overcome a sophisticated adversary.
A principled approach is to shape the victim’s traffic to com-
pletely decorrelate the traffic shape from secrets. Shaping in-
volves padding all outgoing messages to a secret-independent
size and transmitting all packets at secret-independent times.
Unfortunately, a naïve use of this approach requires that each
tenant transmit traffic at the peak rate of its workload, because
any workload-dependent variation could reveal secrets.
Without loss of generality, consider the tenant to be a single-
tier server application serving different client requests. Sup-
pose the shape of the tenant’s outbound network traffic de-
pends on a combination of public (non-private) and private
parameters of the tenant’s workload (i.e. request workload)
and internal state. Our system, Pacer, allows the shape of the
tenant’s response traffic to reflect public but not private infor-
mation, thus protecting secrets while reducing bandwidth and
latency overheads compared to the naïve shaping approach.
Thus, Pacer shapes a tenant’s traffic securely and efficiently.
Security. Whenever the tenant produces network output, a
transmit schedule (shape) is selected for the traffic based on
public information. The tenant’s guest operating system (OS)
prepares network packets as usual. The IaaS hypervisor shapes
traffic as specified by the schedule, transmitting dummy pack-
ets when the guest fails to prepare payload packets in time. The
resulting traffic shape is secret-independent by design.
Efficiency. A tenant partitions its workload based on public
information. For each partition, a profiler samples the distri-
bution of the guest’s unmodified payload traffic shapes and
computes a schedule. All traffic within the partition is then
shaped according to this schedule. Profiling affects perfor-
mance but not security, because any traffic schedule chosen
independent of secrets hides those secrets.
Usability. Pacer places modest requirements on the tenant.
The tenant and its clients must run a guest OS that supports
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Pacer, e.g., by loading the Pacer kernel module for Linux and
running the Pacer profiler. Also, the tenant must indicate to
Pacer how it partitions its workload. This requires only mini-
mal annotations in the tenant application to identify the traffic
boundaries and workload partitions. The workload partition-
ing enables a tenant to choose an appropriate tradeoff between
privacy and overhead for its application. From the Cloud
provider’s perspective, the system requires modest changes to
the IaaS hypervisor.
As described in §8, prior work that decorrelates application
secrets from network side channels either does not present a
working system, or does not consider all network side chan-
nels, or is inherently inefficient when workload traffic is bursty.
To our knowledge, Pacer is the first working system that effi-
ciently prevents all network side-channel leaks by design.
Contributions. This paper presents a novel traffic-shaping
tunnel abstraction that prevents network side-channel leaks
(§4); it describes a paravirtualized tunnel implementation for
an IaaS Cloud that requires modest changes to a hypervisor and
guests, and a gray-box profiler that generates transmit schedu-
les automatically (§5 and §6, respectively); finally, it presents
an experimental evaluation on two applications: a Wiktionary
content server and a streaming video service, which show that
strong mitigation of network side channels is possible with
modest overhead (§7). We discuss related work in §8.
2. Attack feasibility
We first study the conditions under which a network side-
channel attack is possible and demonstrate a simple attack.
Attack prerequisites. To carry out a network side-channel
attack, an adversary must be able to observe a victim’s net-
work traffic. An adversary with access to network elements
like links, switches, or routers can observe the traffic directly.
An adversary without direct access can still observe victim
traffic indirectly if they can control attack traffic that shares
bandwidth with the victim’s traffic.
Indirect observation is impossible if each network flow has
exclusively reserved bandwidth, as in time-division multiple
access (TDMA), which ensures non-interference among flows.
However, this approach prevents statistical multiplexing and
is very inefficient for bursty traffic. On the other hand, when
bandwidth is shared, then regardless of the queuing discipline,
available bandwidth and queuing delays observed by one flow
are influenced by concurrent flows.
Measuring victim’s traffic shape. An adversary can ex-
ploit this fact by measuring either the available bandwidth or
queuing delay, either of which carry a (potentially noisy) sig-
nal about the victim traffic’s shape. To demonstrate a simple
attack, we generate periodic UDP traffic across a shared net-
work link, measure the per-packet delays, and look for delay
shifts that signal a victim flow at least 100KB in size. Our
results show that even a very simple rule-based classifier can
reliably detect the size of victim flows with a resolution of
300KB on a 1 Gbps link. The attack works when the shared
bottleneck is at the server’s access link or a downstream link.
We have also confirmed that the attack works in principle on a
public IBM Cloud, albeit with lower resolution (1 GB), pre-
sumably due to higher network capacity and noise induced
by cross traffic. A more sophisticated, appropriately trained
classifier could no doubt achieve much better resolution and
robustness to noise.
Recognizing videos. Next, we show how we can use
coarse-grained measurements of traffic shape to recognize
MPEG-DASH coded videos with good accuracy. With MPEG-
DASH, videos are divided into variable-sized compressed
segments that each cover 5 seconds of playback time. The
sequence of segment sizes therefore characterizes a video’s
length and content. In a randomly selected set of 956 1080p
videos we downloaded from YouTube, and assuming we can
identify victim flows at 300KB resolution, we can uniquely
identify 681 (72%) of the videos, and place 120, 66, 8, 15, 12,
8, and 46 of the remaining videos in candidate sets of sizes 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 46, respectively.
Our simple experiment confirms prior work [6, 57, 29, 63,
54, 66, 13, 12, 48] and shows that even a very simple attack
can identify videos in a large collection with good accuracy.
While an attack in a production environment faces additional
challenges like achieving co-residency [53, 30, 31] and deal-
ing with noise due to cross-traffic, Cloud tenants that require
strong confidentiality have to consider network-based side-
channels as a realistic threat.
3. Pacer overview
In this section, we state Pacer’s threat model and privacy goals,
and discuss the key ideas to overcome its challenges.
3.1. Threat model
A tenant in a public IaaS Cloud, subsequently called the victim,
executes in one or more guest VMs. The victim performs
arbitrary computations but does not invoke other guest VMs
or Cloud back-end services. The victim serves a set of trusted
clients that connect to guest VMs from outside the Cloud via a
secure virtual private network (VPN), or within the Cloud via
a virtual Cloud network1. (Guests may require a second level
of authentication to separate clients’ privileges, but this is not
relevant for Pacer’s security.) This assumption is reasonable
for services with a restricted audience that require a high
degree of confidentiality (e.g., a content server for employees
of an enterprise or a service that operates on confidential data
of individual clients).
The victim’s goal is to protect its secrets; these secrets
can be reflected in parameters of client requests (i.e., secret
inputs, such as the name of a requested file) or in the victim’s
internal state or code (e.g., which request handlers are cache-
hot because they were recently accessed). The victim rents an
1In principle, Pacer can support multi-tier guests and also guests that
provide an open service to untrusted clients, but these extensions are beyond
the scope of this paper and not implemented in our prototype.
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entire server socket for exclusive use and uses main memory
within the NUMA domain associated with this socket2. The
victim partitions its workload independent of secrets.
Our focus is on server-side security; protecting client pri-
vacy is a non-goal. Moreover, we assume that client request
traffic reveals no secrets through its shape (its length, number
of packets, or timing)3. This implies that the time of requests
does not depend on any secrets or the actual completion times
of previous responses. A victim can design the content being
served to meet this requirement, e.g., in the case of a web
server by in-lining embedded objects, and using Javascript
to decorrelate (in time) requests for embedded links and user
requests that may depend on previously served content.
The adversary seeks to learn the victim’s secrets. It controls
one or more guest VMs in the same public IaaS Cloud and
has the ability to co-locate with the victim’s VMs in the same
server, rack, or data center. The adversary controls network
clients, which may communicate freely with the adversary’s
VMs. The adversary cannot access the victim’s VPN or imper-
sonate the victim’s clients.
The adversary has access to all services available to IaaS
guests, including the ability to time the transmission and re-
ception of its own network packets with high precision. The
adversary also has the ability to intercept and inject network
packets and to observe the guest’s traffic outside the Cloud.
3.2. Challenges and key ideas
A principled approach to avoiding network side channels is
to shape the network traffic so that it cannot reveal secrets. If
done naïvely, shaping can be very costly in terms of bandwidth
or latency when the payload traffic is bursty. Pacer exploits
the following key ideas to reconcile security and efficiency.
Per-guest dynamic shaping. Pacer shapes each guest’s
network traffic dynamically according to its prevailing work-
load, thus enabling dynamic sharing of the available network
capacity among different guests for efficiency. This requires
that the presence and time of requests reveal no secrets, as
assumed in our threat model.
Secret-independent shaping. Instead of insisting on a uni-
form traffic shape for all of a guest’s network traffic, Pacer
allows the shape to vary, as long as the variations don’t depend
on secrets. For instance, if the type of content being requested
from a server (e.g., document vs. video) is not a secret, then
a different traffic shape can be used for the two. This addi-
tional degree of freedom helps minimize overhead for variable
network traffic while preventing leaks of secrets.
Gray-box profiling. Dynamic traffic shaping requires an
understanding of how a guest’s secrets affect its network traffic.
This information can be obtained via program analysis, but
2In principle, this assumption can be relaxed by combining Pacer with
complementary work to mitigate side-channel leaks through shared memory
buses, caches, and micro-architectural CPU state [61, 11].
3This assumption can be avoided by shaping client traffic. In principle,
Pacer can support this by running a hypervisor on the client side.
that is difficult on arbitrary binaries running in a VM. Black-
box profiling can be performed on arbitrary guests, but cannot
reliably discover all dependencies and therefore is not secure.
Pacer instead relies on gray-box profiling, which requires no
knowledge of a guest’s internals beyond an explicit traffic
indicator from the guest. This indicator partitions the guest’s
possible network interactions independent of secrets and indi-
cates the onset of a particular interaction. It is used by Pacer
in two ways: (i) to profile the guest’s network interactions
and generate a transmit schedule for each partition, and (ii) to
instantiate a transmit schedule for a network interaction. As
long as a guest computes the indicator independent of secrets,
the choice of indicator affects performance but not security.
Paravirtualized support for traffic shaping. Pacer pro-
vides paravirtualized hypervisor support that enables guests to
implement a traffic-shaping network tunnel, while adding only
a modest amount of code to the hypervisor. A performance-
isolated shaping component in the hypervisor initiates trans-
missions based on a schedule. If no payload is available at the
time of a packet’s scheduled transmission, the shaping compo-
nent transmits a dummy packet instead that, to the adversary,
is indistinguishable from a payload packet.
4. Traffic-shaping tunnel
Pacer’s key abstraction is a traffic-shaping tunnel. The
tunnel shapes application payload traffic to make it secret-
independent, thus defending against adversaries who can ob-
serve, directly or indirectly, traffic inside the tunnel. In this
section, we describe the tunnel and its security independent of
a specific application setting, implementation, or placement
of tunnel entry and exits. In §5, we evolve the design to work
within the constraints of a realistic Cloud environment.
Requirements. We begin with the requirements for a
traffic-shaping tunnel. Secret-independent traffic shape: Trans-
missions must follow a schedule that does not depend on se-
crets; actual transmission times must not be delayed by poten-
tially secret-dependent computations. Unobservable payload
traffic: The traffic shape must not reveal, directly or indirectly,
an application’s actual time and rate of payload generation and
consumption. This implies that flow control must not affect the
traffic shape; that padded content must elicit the same response
(e.g., ACKs) from receivers as payload data; and that packet
encryption must encompass the padding. This in turn requires
that padding be added at or above the transport layer, while
encryption be done below the transport layer. Congestion con-
trol: The tunnel must react to network congestion. Congestion
control is needed for network stability and fairness, and does
not reveal secrets since it reacts to network conditions, which
themselves depend only on shaped and third-party traffic.
Architecture. Figure 1 shows the tunnel’s architecture. The
tunnel protocol stack runs on both tunnel endpoints. (Only
one of two symmetric endpoints is shown in the figure.) The
tunnel protocol stack consists of a shaping layer on top of a
modified transport layer (e.g., TCP) on top of the encryption
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Figure 1: Traffic-shaping tunnel (one endpoint)
layer. These three layers rest on top of conventional IP and
link layers. Each tunnel is associated with a flow identified by
a 5-tuple of source and destination IP addresses and ports, and
the transport protocol.4
The shaping layer initiates transmissions according to a
schedule and pads packets to a uniform size. It interacts with
applications via a set of shared, lock-free queues. The layer
takes application data from a per-flow outbound queue and
transmits it in the tunnel. It places incoming data from the
tunnel into a per-flow inbound queue. Finally, it receives
traffic indicators and per-flow crypto keys (to be used by the
encryption layer) via a per-application command queue.
A separate, user-level gray-box profiler (ProfPace) ana-
lyzes timestamps and traffic indicators collected by the tunnel,
and generates and updates transmit schedules in the schedule
database. ProfPace is described in §6.
Assumptions. The execution of the tunnel network stack
is assumed to be performance-isolated from the application
and any other computation outside the stack. As a result, the
processing delays in the stack cannot be influenced by compu-
tations outside the stack, which could depend on secrets.
The shaping, transport, and encryption layers operate on
cleartext data. Therefore, we must assume that they execute in
constant time with respect to both the amount and content of
data they process. That is, these layers avoid data-dependent
control flow and memory access patterns in the implementa-
tion of their data paths. As a result, the layers’ processing
delays and memory footprints are independent of the amount
and content of payload data.
Transmit schedules. A transmit schedule is a finite series
of times at which packets within a flow are transmitted. A
schedule is typically associated with a type of packet train, e.g.,
a file transfer or the response to a request for service. There
is at most one active schedule on a flow at a time; successive
schedules on the same flow are non-overlapping in time.
Outbound data processing. A timestamp is taken when-
4We describe the tunnel in terms of TCP; however, another stack like
QUIC [36] can also be used.
ever data is queued by the application; these timestamps and
the recorded traffic indicators are shared with the gray-box
profiler. The shaping layer retrieves a chunk of available data
from the flow’s outbound queue whenever a transmission is
due on a flow according to the active schedule (if any) and the
congestion window is open (see transport layer below). The
layer removes a number of bytes that is the minimum of (i) the
available bytes in the queue, (ii) the receiver’s flow control
window (see transport layer below), and (iii) M, the network’s
maximal transfer unit (MTU) minus the size of all headers in
the stack. If fewer than M bytes (possibly zero) were retrieved
from the queue due to payload unavailability or flow control,
the shaping layer pads the chunk to M bytes. It adds a header
that indicates the number of padding bytes added.
Transport layer. The transport layer operates as normal,
except for two tunnel-related modifications: 1) When the con-
gestion window closes, the transport layer signals the shaping
layer to suspend the flow’s transmit schedule until the conges-
tion window reopens. Schedule suspension ensures network
stability and TCP-friendliness, and does not leak information
because it depends only on network conditions. 2) Flow con-
trol is modified to make it unobservable to the adversary. The
transport layer signals to the shaping layer the size of the flow
control window advertised by the receiver. This window con-
trols how much payload data is included in packets generated
by the shaping layer (see above). The transport layer trans-
mits packets irrespective of the flow control window, sending
dummy packets while the window is closed, which are dis-
carded at the other end of the tunnel.
The transport layer passes outbound packets to the encryp-
tion layer, which adds a message authentication code (MAC)
keyed with the flow’s key to a header and encrypts the packet
with the flow’s key. Finally, encrypted packets are passed to
the IP layer, where they are processed as normal down the
remaining stack and transmitted by the NIC.
Inbound packet processing. Packets arriving from the
tunnel are timestamped; the stamps are shared with the profiler.
Packets pass through the layers in reverse order, causing TCP
to potentially send ACKs. The encryption layer decrypts and
discards packets with an incorrect MAC. The shaping layer
strips padding and places the remaining payload bytes (if any)
into the inbound queue shared with the application.
Schedule installation. A transmit schedule must be in-
stalled on a flow before data can be sent via the tunnel. A
guest application does so indirectly by sending traffic indica-
tors. The application provides the flow’s 5-tuple f , a traffic
id sid (which maps to a transmit schedule), and a type. The
shaping layer looks up the schedule associated with sid in the
schedule database and associates it with flow f .
There are two types of schedules: default and custom. A
default schedule is installed when the flow is created. This
schedule acts as a template, which is instantiated automatically
by the shaping layer whenever an incoming packet arrives that
indicates the start of a new network exchange (e.g., a GET
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request on a persistent HTTP connection), identified by the
TCP PSH flag. The schedule starts at a time equal to the arrival
time of the packet that causes the schedule’s instantiation.
A default schedule active on a flow can be extended by a
custom schedule in response to an application traffic indicator.
For instance, a default schedule that allows a TLS handshake
might be extended with one that is appropriate for the response
to the first incoming network request. The new schedule can
extend the currently active schedule only if the new schedule’s
prefix matches the prefix of the currently active schedule that
has already been played out. Because the new schedule is
anchored at the same time as the profile it extends, the time of
a schedule extension is unobservable to the adversary. A traffic
indicator that would require a custom profile that does not
match the played-out prefix of the active schedule is ignored.
4.1. Tunnel security
Next, we justify the tunnel’s security, summarized by property
S0: The shape of traffic in the tunnel does not depend on se-
crets. Follows from S1–S7.
S1: Transmit schedules are chosen based on public informa-
tion. By assumption about applications’ choice of schedules.
S2: The traffic in the tunnel is independent of the payload
traffic. Holds because packets are (i) padded and transmitted
independently of the application’s rate of payload generation
and consumption; (ii) elicit a transport-layer response from the
receiver independently of payload traffic; and (iii) the packet
contents including headers that reveal padding are encrypted.
S3: All packet transmissions follow a schedule. Holds because
shaping initiates transmissions according to a schedule.
S4: Delays between scheduled and actual packet transmission
times do not reflect secrets. Follows from the fact that the
tunnel stack, from the shaping layer down, is performance-
isolated from any secret-dependent computation and layers
that operate on cleartext are constant-time.
S5: Transmit schedules are activated, paused, and re-activated
at a secret-independent delay from any observable event that
causally precedes the pausing or (re-)activation. Holds be-
cause (i) pausing, reactivation, and instantiation of default
schedules is performed within the performance-isolated tunnel
stack; and (ii), by assumption, custom schedule installations
that take immediate effect are not causally preceded by an
observable event.
S6: Transmit schedules are suspended and resumed only ac-
cording to the network’s congestion state. Follows from the
tunnel’s transport layer congestion control mechanism.
S7: Modifications of active transmit schedules do not reveal
secrets. Holds because the time of schedule replacement is
unobservable to the adversary (matching prefix).
5. Pacer design
In the previous section, we described a generic traffic-shaping
tunnel, which ensures that the shape of traffic within the tunnel
reveals no secrets by design. In this section, we describe the
full design of Pacer, which is a practical implementation of a
traffic-shaping tunnel in the context of a public IaaS Cloud.
We begin with a discussion of constraints on the design
space in the context of a IaaS Cloud. First, the tunnel entry
must be integrated with the IaaS server. In an IaaS Cloud,
co-located tenants typically share the network link attached
to the server and can therefore indirectly observe each others’
traffic. Therefore, the tunnel entry must be in the IaaS server
to ensure the attached link lies inside the tunnel.
Second, as we know from the previous section, the tunnel
requires that the network stack is performance-isolated from
secret-dependent computations and layers that deal with clear-
text are constant-time. In the context of an IaaS server, all
guest computation must be assumed to be secret-dependent.
These circumstances suggest that shaping should be imple-
mented in the IaaS hypervisor, where it can be executed with
dedicated resources and tightly controlled. Finally, shaping
requires padding, which must be done at the transport layer
to unsure it is unobservable.
A simple way to meet all requirements is to place the entire
network stack into the hypervisor and performance-isolate
it from guests. This approach, however, has significant lim-
itations. First, ensuring performance isolation for an entire
network stack is technically challenging even in the hypervisor.
Second, the approach requires that guests and their network
peers use a fixed network stack provided by the IaaS platform.
Third, it adds significant complexity to the hypervisor.
Pacer architecture. Pacer addresses the tension outlined
above using a paravirtualization approach. In Pacer, the hyper-
visor cooperates with the guest OS to implement the traffic-
shaping tunnel. The responsibilities are divided in such a way
that (i) the hypervisor can ensure tunnel security with only
weak assumptions about a guest’s rate of progress; (ii) the
performance-isolated hypervisor component is small; (iii) re-
quired changes to the guest OS are modest. Effectively, we
extend the IaaS hypervisor to provide a small set of functions
that allows guests to implement a traffic-shaping tunnel, while
guests retain the flexibility to use custom stacks.
Figure 2 shows Pacer’s architecture. Unlike the strictly
layered tunnel stack from §4, Pacer factors out a small set of
functions that inherently require performance-isolation into the
lowest layer, implemented in the IaaS hypervisor. The HyPace
component plugs into Xen and provides these functions. The
GPace component, a Linux kernel module, plugs into the guest
OS and the OS of any network clients that interact with the
guest. It implements the tunnel in cooperation with HyPace.
HyPace instantiates transmit schedules, encrypts and MACs
packets, and initiates their transmissions, while masking poten-
tially secret-dependent delays in its execution. It can generate
padded (dummy) packets subject to congestion control inde-
pendently from the guest network stack, thereby avoiding the
need to performance-isolate the guest. GPace pads payload
packets, and exposes each flow’s congestion window, sequence
number, and crypto key to HyPace. The guest has direct access
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Figure 2: Pacer architecture
to a virtual NIC (vNIC) configured by the hypervisor, which
it uses to receive but not to transmit packets. Pacer’s security
properties remain equivalent to the generic tunnel’s (§5.3).
5.1. HyPace
Similar to the shaping layer in the generic tunnel, HyPace
receives traffic indicators from applications (via GPace), in-
stantiates template schedules in response to incoming packets
(signaled by GPace), and initiates transmissions. To ensure
tunnel security despite potentially secret-dependent delays in
the guest, however, HyPace performs additional functions and
there are differences, which we discuss next.
HyPace implements padding, encryption, and congestion
control in cooperation with the guest. HyPace pauses a trans-
mit schedule when a flow’s congestion window closes and
resumes the schedule when it reopens. When a transmission
is due on a flow and the congestion window is open, HyPace
checks whether the guest has queued a payload packet. If not,
it generates a dummy packet with proper padding, transport
header, and encryption, using the next available TCP sequence
number and the flow key shared with the guest. Finally, it
initiates the transmission of the payload or dummy packet and
reduces the congestion window accordingly.
Interface with guests. HyPace shares a memory region
pairwise with each guest. This region contains a data structure
for each active flow. The flow structure contains the following
information: the connection 5-tuple associated with the flow;
a sequence of transmission schedule objects; the current TCP
sequence number seq and the right edge of the congestion
window cw; the flow’s encryption key; and, a queue of packets
prepared for transmission by the guest. Each transmit schedule
object contains the sid and a starting timestamp. HyPace and
the guest use lock-free synchronization on data they share.
Packet transmission. HyPace transmits packets according
to the active schedule in the packet’s flow. From a security
standpoint, packets need not be transmitted at the exact sched-
uled times; however, any deviation between scheduled and
actual time must not reveal secrets.
On general-purpose server hardware, it is challenging to
initiate packet transmissions such that their timing cannot
be influenced by concurrent, secret-dependent computations.
Using hardware timers, events can be scheduled with cycle
accuracy. However, the activation time and execution time
of a software event handler is influenced by a myriad of fac-
tors. These may include (i) disabled interrupts at the time of
the scheduled event; (ii) the CPU’s microarchitectural, cache,
and write buffer state at the time of the event; (iii) concur-
rent bus traffic; (iv) frequency and voltage scaling; and (v)
non-maskable interrupts during the handler execution. Many
of these factors are influenced by the state of concurrent ex-
ecutions on the IaaS server and may therefore carry a timing
signal about secrets in those executions.
Masking event handler execution time. HyPace masks
hardware state-dependent delays to make sure they do not
affect the actual time of transmissions. A general approach is
as follows. First, we determine empirically the distribution of
delays between the scheduled time of a transmission and the
time when HyPace’s event handler writes to the NIC’s doorbell
register, which initiates the transmission. We measure this
distribution under diverse concurrent workloads to get a good
estimate of its true maximum. We relax this estimate further to
account for the possibility that we may not have observed the
true maximum and call this resulting delay δxmit . Second, for a
transmission scheduled at time tn, we schedule a timer event at
tn−δxmit . Third, when the event handler is ready to write to the
NIC doorbell register, it spins in a tight loop reading the CPU’s
clock cycle register until tn is reached and then performs the
write. By spinning until tn, HyPace masks the event handler’s
actual execution time, which could be affected by secrets.
Unfortunately, the measured distribution of event handler
delays has a long tail. We observed that the median and
maximum delay can differ by three orders of magnitude (tens
of nanoseconds to tens of microseconds). This presents a
problem: With the simple masking approach, a single core
could at most initiate one transmission every δxmit seconds,
making it infeasible to achieve the line rate of even a 10Gbps
link. Instead, we rely on batched transmissions.
Batched transmissions. The solution is based on two in-
sights. First, instances in the tail of the event handler delay
distribution tend to be independent. As a result, the maximal
delay for transmitting n packets in a single event handler ac-
tivation does not increase much with n. Therefore, we can
amortize the overhead of masking handler delays over n pack-
ets. Second, actual transmission times can be delayed as long
as the delay does not depend on secrets. Therefore, it is safe
to batch transmissions.
We divide time into epochs, such that all packet transmis-
sions from an IaaS server scheduled in the same epoch, across
all guests and flows, are transmitted at the end of that epoch.
An event handler is scheduled once per epoch, it prepares all
packets scheduled in the epoch, spins until the batch trans-
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mission time, and then initiates the transmission with a single
write to the NIC’s doorbell register.
Let us consider factors that could delay the actual packet
transmission time once the spinning core issues the doorbell
write. Reads were executed before the spin, so the state of
caches plays no role. The write buffer should be empty after
the spin. Interference from concurrent NIC DMA transfers
reflects shaped traffic and is therefore secret-independent. Sim-
ilarly, any delays in the NIC itself due to concurrent outbound
or inbound traffic cannot depend on secrets. However, the
doorbell write itself could be delayed by traffic on the memory
bus, PCIe bus, or bus controller/switch.
Hardware interference and NIC support. A remaining
source of delays are concurrent bus transactions caused by
potentially secret-dependent computations. We tried to detect
such delays empirically and have not been able to find clear
evidence of them. Nonetheless, such delays cannot be ruled
out on general-purpose hardware. A principled way to rule
out such interference would require hardware support.
For instance, a scheduled packet transmission function pro-
vided by the NIC would be sufficient. Software would queue
packets for transmission with a future transmission time t. At
time t − δbus, the NIC DMAs packets into onboard staging
buffers in the NIC. Here, δbus would be chosen to be larger
than the maximal possible delay due to bus contention. At
time t, the NIC would initiate the transmission automatically.
With such NIC support, HyPace would prepare packets for
transmission as usual, but instead of spinning until tn it would
immediately queue packets with t = tn. Incidentally, NIC
support for timed transmissions is also relevant for traffic
management, and a similar “transmit on time stamp” feature
is already available on modern smart NICs [2]. We plan to
investigate NIC support in future work.
5.2. GPace
GPace is a Linux kernel module that implements a traffic-
shaping tunnel jointly with HyPace. On the client-side of a
network connection, GPace extends the kernel to terminate the
tunnel. GPace pads outgoing TCP segments to MTU size and
removes the padding on the receive path. It modifies Linux’s
TCP implementation to share its per-flow congestion window
and sequence number with HyPace, and to notify HyPace of
retransmissions so that HyPace can extend the active schedule
by one transmission. Unlike in the generic tunnel, where
the shaping occurs above the transport layer, this schedule
extension is necessary to allow for retransmission; it does not
leak information because it depends only on network state.
Note that TCP’s flow control window is not advertised to
HyPace, causing HyPace to send dummies if the receiver’s
flow control window is closed, as required. GPace timestamps
outbound data arriving from applications and inbound packets
from the tunnel in the vNIC interrupt handler. All timestamps
and recorded traffic indicators are given to the profiler (§6).
GPace allows applications to install session keys and pro-
vide traffic indicators on flows via IOCTL calls on network
sockets. Recall that applications specify a flow, a traffic ID sid
and a type as arguments when indicating traffic. GPace passes
this information into the per-flow queue shared with HyPace,
which uses the sid as an index to look up the corresponding
transmit schedule in the database.
Packet processing. With GPace, the guest OS generates
TCP segments as usual, but pads them to the MTU size before
passing them to the IP layer. Instead of queuing packets in
the vNIC’s transmit queue, GPace queues them in per-flow
transmit queues shared with HyPace. The guest OS processes
incoming packets as usual by accepting interrupts and retriev-
ing packets directly from its vNIC.
Schedule (re-)activation delays. Unlike the generic tun-
nel, Pacer processes inbound network packets in the guest,
which is not performance-isolated. Therefore, care must be
taken to ensure that the time of activation or re-activation of a
transmit schedule in response to an inbound packet does not
reveal the guest kernel’s execution time, which could depend
on secrets. Schedule (re-)activation must occur at a defined,
secret-independent delay from the event that causally precedes
it, e.g., a packet arrival.
Let ε be HyPace’s epoch length and δrecv be the guest OS’s
empirical maximal inbound packet processing time. There
are four such events to consider: 1) The arrival of the first
packet of a request. GPace instantiates a default schedule with
a start time equal to the packet’s arrival time. To make sure
the first transmission occurs in time, we require that the initial
response time of any default schedule be larger than ε+δrecv.
2) The arrival of an ACK that opens the congestion window.
GPace ensures the ACK does not enable a transmission that is
scheduled within ε+δrecv of the ACK’s arrival. 3) The arrival
of an ACK that causes a retransmission. GPace ensures the
ACK does not enable a transmission that is scheduled less that
ε+δrecv from the ACK’s arrival. 4) A timeout that causes a
retransmission. GPace ensures the timeout does not enable a
transmission that is scheduled within ε+δrecv of the timeout.
Here, we use δrecv as a conservative upper bound on the delay
of the timeout event handler.
These four rules make the guest’s actual processing time for
incoming packets and timeouts unobservable to the adversary.
5.3. Pacer security
We justify Pacer’s overall security. Pacer’s threat model rules
out side channels via shared CPU state, caches, and mem-
ory bandwidth, as well as shared Cloud back-end services.
Therefore, the adversary is limited to (i) trying to connect to
the victim as a client and observe the timing and content of
responses, or (ii) measuring the shape of the victim’s traffic
by observing packet delays on a shared network link.
Attack (i) is not possible because the adversary cannot elicit
a response from the victim. Pacer relies on encryption and a
MAC keyed with pre-shared keys and GPace silently ignores
incoming packets that cannot be authenticated. Attack (ii) is
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unproductive, because the victim’s incoming traffic shape is
secret-independent by assumption and its outgoing traffic is
shaped to be secret-independent. Next, we justify that the
victim’s outgoing traffic shape is indeed secret-independent
by design. In other words, Pacer’s tunnel has property S0 of
the generic tunnel from §4.
S1 and S3 hold trivially, because the relevant behavior of
Pacer is equivalent to the generic tunnel’s. S2 holds because
Pacer, like the generic tunnel, pads packets above the transport
layer, encrypts packets below the padding layer, and makes
flow control unobservable. S4 follows from GPace’s rules on
the pausing and (re-)activation of transmission schedules. S5
holds because HyPace’s batch transmission mechanism masks
the execution time of its transmission event handler. S6 holds
because HyPace cooperates with GPace to pause and resume
schedules in response to the network’s congestion state. Even
though a schedule can be extended in Pacer, S7 still holds
because schedule extension happens only in response to a
packet loss, which is a public event.
6. Generating schedules
ProfPace profiles guests and generates transmit schedules. It
analyzes the guest’s recorded network interactions and traffic
indicators. For content-serving guest applications, we also
analyze the guest’s content corpus to suggest a clustering that
balances efficiency and privacy.
6.1. Gray-box profiling
ProfPace analyzes the arrival times of incoming packets, the
times at which the guest OS queues packets for transmission,
and the traffic indicators from guest applications. The guest’s
traffic indicators serve three purposes. First, they delimit
segments of semantically related sequences of inbound and
outbound packets within a network flow. Second, the sid
value indicated by the guest identifies segments of the same
equivalence class, e.g., a TLS handshake, or a response to
a request within a given workload partition. Recall that the
application determines the sid based on public information;
the sid therefore partitions the guest’s network interactions by
public information. Third, the indicators indicate the onset of
a network interaction and therefore provide an opportunity to
install the appropriate schedule.
ProfPace bins the recorded network interaction segments
by sid. The set of observed segments in a bin are considered
samples of the associated equivalence class of network inter-
actions. ProfPace characterizes each class by a set of random
variables. Empirically, we have determined the following vari-
ables sufficient: The delay between the first incoming packet
and the first response packet di; the time between subsequent
response packets ds; and, the number of response packets p.
For each class, the profiler samples the distribution of these
random variables from the segments in the associated bin.
Finally, ProfPace generates a transmit schedule for sid based
on the sampled distributions of the random variables. Specif-
ically, it generates a schedule with the 100th %-ile of the
number of packets p, the 99th %-ile of the initial delay di, and
the 90th %-ile of the spacing among subsequent packets ds.
We have determined empirically that this works well.
Recall that as long as applications choose sid values based
on public information, transmit schedules are relevant only
for performance not security. An inadequate schedule could
increase delays and waste network bandwidth due to extra
padding, but cannot leak secrets. For good performance, dur-
ing profiling runs, the guests should sample the space of work-
loads with different values of the public and private informa-
tion, as well as different guest load levels, so that the resulting
profiles capture the space of network traffic shapes well. Next,
we consider how a guest can partition its workload to trade off
performance and privacy in the case of a content server.
6.2. Corpus analysis
Pacer reduces overhead by allowing the shape of network traf-
fic to reveal information deemed public by the guest. More-
over, a guest may define public/private information in order
to trade off performance and confidentiality. For instance,
a guest that serves a corpus of objects with a skewed size
distribution faces a tradeoff: Hiding the workload perfectly
requires padding every requested object to the largest object
in the corpus; clustering the corpus such that each object is
padded to the largest object in its cluster reduces overhead
but reveals the cluster of a requested object. Reasoning about
privacy with this clustering, particularly when the corpus’ pop-
ularity distribution is not known, is challenging in general and
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we highlight the
large efficiency gains possible when clustering content with
skewed size distributions. We show results when clustering
the English Wiktionary and Wikipedia corpuses by size in §7.
We cluster videos according to the sequence and size of
their 5-second segments using the following algorithm. Note
that the dynamically compressed segments of a video differ in
size. Initially, we over-approximate the shape of each video vi
by its maximal segment size smaxi and its number of segments
li. For each distinct video length l and each distinct maximal
segment size s in the entire dataset, we compute the set of
videos that are dominated by 〈l,s〉. A video vi is dominated
by 〈l,s〉 if li ≤ l and smaxi ≤ s.
Let c be a desired minimum cluster size. Our algorithm
works in rounds. In each round, we select every 〈l,s〉 dom-
inating at least c videos, and we choose as cluster the set of
videos minimizing the average padding overhead per video,
i.e. 1ci ∑
ci
j=1∑
li
k=1 max1≤ j≤ci((sk)− sk j), where ci is the cardi-
nality of the set of videos, li is the maximal length across all
videos in the set and sk is the maximal size of the k-th segment
across all videos in the set. Once a cluster is formed, videos
in it are not taken into account in later rounds. The algorithm
terminates when all videos are clustered. If the last cluster has
less than c videos, it is merged with the one formed before it.
We show results of clustering YouTube videos in §7.1.
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7. Evaluation
In this section, we describe our implementation, and present
results of an empirical evaluation of our Pacer prototype.
We implemented HyPace for Xen and GPace’s Linux ker-
nel module in 8,100 and ~15K lines of C, respectively. We
imported 4,458 lines of AESNI assembly code from OpenSSL
to encrypt packets in HyPace. We implemented ProfPace in
1,800 lines of Python and 1,200 lines of C. At each site in
an application’s code where a message is sent to the network,
we add 15 LoC to send a traffic indicator via IOCTL to the
guest kernel. We identified and modified these sites manually;
automating the instrumentation is possible but remains future
work. No other changes were required to guest applications.
All experiments were performed on Dell PowerEdge R730
server machines with Intel Xeon E5-2667, 3.2 GHz, 16 core
CPU (two sockets, 8 cores per socket), 512 GB RAM, and a
Broadcom BCM 57800 10Gbps Ethernet card. The NIC was
configured to export virtual NICs (vNICs). We disabled hyper-
threading, dynamic voltage and frequency scaling, and power
management in the hosts. We used Xen hypervisor 4.10.0 on
the hosts, and the ‘Null’ scheduler [4] for VM scheduling.
We assigned 40GB RAM and one of the CPU sockets to
Xen; up to two cores are configured to execute the HyPace
transmit event handler in parallel; flows are partitioned among
the cores. The guest runs in a VM with 8 cores and 64 GB
RAM, and has access to a vNIC. The VCPUs of the guest
VM were pinned one-to-one to cores on the second socket of
the host CPU. This is in line with our threat model, which
assumes that guests rent dedicated CPU sockets.
The guest runs an Ubuntu 16.04 LTS kernel (version 4.9.5,
x86-64), and Apache HTTP Server 2.4. Network clients run
Ubuntu 16.04 LTS without a hypervisor. The wiki application
is based on Mediawiki 1.27.1, which serves dynamic web
pages. It internally stores the wiki dataset in a database hosted
locally on MySQL 5.7.16. We used a modified wrk2 [3]
client to issue HTTPS GET requests for various pages to the
Mediawiki server. We also wrote a custom video streaming
server in PHP, which works like a simple file server serving
video segments in response to client requests. The videos were
hosted on an ext4 file system on a VM disk.
7.1. Spatial padding overhead
First, we measure the spatial padding overhead when cluster-
ing content as described in §6.2. This overhead corresponds
to the network bandwidth overhead for Pacer’s traffic shap-
ing. We clustered three different datasets: (i) a 2016 snap-
shot of the English Wiktionary corpus (5,027,344 documents,
max 521.9kB, median 4.7kB), (ii) a 2008 snapshot of the En-
glish Wikipedia corpus (14,257,494 documents, max 14.3MB,
median 83.5kB), and (iii) a set of videos downloaded from
YouTube in March 2018 (1218 videos, max 468.7MB, median
6.2MB). Figure 3 shows the reduction in the average and maxi-
mum padding overhead with increasing number of clusters and
decreasing minimum cluster size (i.e, the minimum number of
objects in each cluster). Even coarse-grained clustering leads
to a significant reduction in padding overhead.
7.2. Microbenchmarks
We empirically select a suitable epoch length ε , the maximum
batch size B (number of packets to be prepared by a HyPace
handler) in each epoch, δxmit , and δrecv. To this end, we ran
multiple, 12-hour experiments with varying network work-
loads. We requested 100KB sized documents from the Me-
diawiki web server using concurrent clients. As background
workload, we ran large matrix multiplications on dom0. The
workloads were configured to drive CPUs to near 100% uti-
lization, and had a total working set of ~12GB.
To determine δxmit , ε and B, we measured the cost of prepar-
ing batches of packets for transmission in HyPace Over many
observations in the presence of the background load described
above, we first determined the number of packets that can be
safely prepared with different epoch lengths with a single Hy-
Pace handler. Within epochs of length 30µs, 50µs, 100µs and
120µs, the number of packets was 5, 14, 33, and 42, respec-
tively, which allows HyPace to achieve 22%, 28%, 41% and
42% of the NIC line rate with a single core. We configured ε
to be 120µs for all HyPace handlers.
Based on these results, we use two parallel HyPace handlers
running on separate cores. In this configuration, we repeated
our measurements and chose B = 38 packets and δxmit = 35
for each handler. δrecv is independent of the number of Hy-
Pace threads, and its average and maximum values observed
across all experiment configurations were 3.9ms and 15.8ms,
respectively. We conservatively configured δrecv to 20ms.
7.3. Video service
Next, we measure the impact of Pacer’s traffic shaping on a
video streaming service. We implemented a streaming client
in Python that simulates a MPEG-DASH player: when a user
requests a video, the client initially fetches six segments (cov-
ering 5 seconds of video each) in succession to fill up a local
buffer. After reaching 50% of the initial buffer (rebuffering
goal), the player starts consuming the segments from the buffer.
The client fetches subsequent segments sequentially whenever
space is available in the buffer. With Pacer, the player does not
request a segment until the transfer of the previous segment
has finished, including any padding; otherwise, the timing of
the client’s request would reveal the actual size of the previous
segment. We measure the impact of traffic shaping on: (1) the
initial delay until the video starts playing; (2) the frequency
and duration of any pauses (video skipping) experienced by
the player; (3) the download latency for individual video seg-
ments. The client sequentially plays four videos, randomly
chosen among 1218 videos, for up to 5 minutes each. The
videos were clustered into 19 clusters with at least 61 elements
each. We ran experiments for a client with high bandwidth
(10Gbps) and with low bandwidth (10Mbps).
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Figure 3: Padding overhead vs number of clusters and minimum cluster size (log-log scale) for (a) English Wiktionary, (b) English
Wikipedia and (c) Video dataset
Transmit schedules generated by ProfPace seek to download
each segment as fast as the available bandwidth allows, which
is how the baseline system works. With these schedules, there
is no noticeable impact on the user experience for using Pacer.
Initial startup delays don’t increase significantly, and there is
no video skipping in any of the experiments. When serving
128 clients, the maximum CPU utilization increases from
3.73% to 6.26% with Pacer.
Pacer’s shaping also provides an opportunity to use domain
knowledge to optimize schedules. We know that downloading
the largest segment in our collection of 240p videos within
its 5 second deadline requires 550kbps. Therefore, we can
conservatively modify the inter-packet spacing in the sched-
ules to 6ms, corresponding to a bandwidth of about 2Mbps.
For clients with 10 Mbps bandwidth this optimization avoids
losses and reduces the segment download latency significantly,
but we omit the full results due to space constraints. This
schedule optimization does not affect security; it only takes
advantage of Pacer to reduce network contention, a known
benefit of traffic shaping.
7.4. Mediawiki
Next, we measured Pacer’s impact on the throughput of Medi-
awiki serving the English Wiktionary corpus. Clients request
different Wiktionary pages concurrently and synchronously
for a period of 120s. Prior to the measurement, we run the
workload for 10s to warm up the caches. We used a coarse-
grained clustering of the Wiktionary corpus with one cluster of
5,010,856 files up to 12KB in size and another with the remain-
ing 16,488 files, which yields an average padding overhead of
150%. We requested the largest file from each cluster several
times with varying number of concurrent clients. Additionally,
we ran a trace where clients request 1,000 random files from
both clusters.
Figure 4 shows the throughput vs average latency for the
baseline and Pacer. The error bars show the standard devi-
ations of the average latencies. We used the request trace
workload (TraceBase and TracePacer correspond to baseline
and Pacer respectively) and, for comparison, we also stressed
the server with requests only to the largest file in the corpus
(521.9KB) (LargeBase and LargePacer for baseline and Pacer).
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Figure 4: Mediawiki xput vs latency
Unlike the baseline, Pacer’s latency remains constant until
the maximal throughput, because latency is determined by the
transmission schedule. Once the server is at capacity, it fails to
serve additional requests and clients time out. Pacer’s latencies
are higher than the baseline’s because the profiler generates
conservative schedules based on all samples observed during
profiling. Nevertheless, the latencies remain within hundreds
of milliseconds, and could be optimized substantially using
different schedules for different load conditions.
Pacer incurs a 6.8% and 30% overhead on peak throughput
for the trace workload and the large file, respectively. With the
large file, the baseline operates at over 40% of the line rate,
and we believe that Pacer’s performance in this challenging
experiment is limited by the accuracy of transmit schedules,
which can be improved substantially.
8. Related work
Attacks using network side channels. Network side chan-
nel attacks can be launched by observing the total number
and sizes of packets [16, 58, 22, 15], their timing [14, 27],
and more coarse-grained information, such as burst lengths,
the frequency of bursts, burst volumes [23, 66, 64], and a
combination of such features [28, 40, 55]. Attacks have been
shown to discover what a user is typing over SSH [57], which
websites a user is visiting [29, 63], what videos are being
streamed [54], the contents of live conversations [66] and
private keys [13, 12], even with end-to-end encryption and
techniques like onion routing in place [48].
Within the context of Cloud computing, the setting of this
paper, Ristenpart et al. [53] and Inci et al. [30, 31] show
that targeted attacks can be carried out by first attaining co-
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residency with a desired victim, and then exploiting side chan-
nels, including contention on I/O ports [53, Section 8.3]. Agar-
wal et al. [6] first demonstrated the type of attack we studied
in a more general form in §2.
Mitigating network side channels. Dependence of packet
size on secrets can be eliminated by padding all packets to
a fixed length [29, 66]. This standard technique is also used
by Pacer. Dependence of packet timing on secrets can be
eliminated by sending packets at a fixed rate independent of
the actual workload, inserting dummy packets when no actual
packets exist [55, 57]. However, this either wastes bandwidth
or incurs high latencies when the workload is bursty.
A more efficient strategy is predictive mitigation [8, 72],
where a packet transmission schedule is built ahead of time,
independent of any secrets. At each scheduled transmission,
the enforcement mechanism transmits a packet if the applica-
tion has provided one, else nothing is transmitted and a 1-bit
leak is incurred. At every leak, the schedule is adapted using a
prediction algorithm (based only on public inputs) to reduce
the chances of a future leak. Pacer improves this idea to elim-
inate timing leaks completely (by sending a dummy packet
when the application does not provide a packet on time), and
shows that the idea works in a practical system. On the flip
side, prior work considers adversaries who may compromise
clients, while Pacer assumes that clients are trusted.
Traffic morphing [67] and related work like Walkie-
Talkie [65] shape traffic to make sensitive responses similar
(ideally identical) to non-sensitive responses. Unlike Pacer,
such techniques do not provide strong security—they only
introduce some degree of uncertainty for the adversary.
BuFLO [23] proposes to shape traffic to evenly-spaced
bursts of a fixed number of packets for a certain minimum
amount of time after a request starts. Our pacing strategy is
a significant generalization of BuFLO, where the shape may
be different for every partition of requests. Cai et al. [14] pro-
pose a simple extension of BuFLO to make pacing sensitive to
congestion signals, much like Pacer. BuFLO and its extension
have not been integrated into any real system.
In constant-time cryptography [20, 18, 19] the victim’s code
is modified either manually or with a compiler transformation
to make the timing of outputs independent of secrets. This
approach has been applied widely to secure small pieces of
code like cryptographic libraries but has not been shown to
scale to large software so far.
Mitigating network side channels in Clouds. Contention
on NICs in a Cloud can be mitigated by time-division mul-
tiple access (TDMA) in a hypervisor [34] as this eliminates
the adversary VM’s ability to observe a co-located victim’s
traffic. However, this approach is inherently inefficient when
the payload traffic is bursty. Statistical multiplexing, which
caps the amount of data transmitted by a VM in an epoch, is
fundamentally insecure as it allows side-channel attacks (§2).
Another defense is to restrict the adversary VM’s ability to
observe time [62, 44, 42]. StopWatch [39] replaces a VM’s
clock with virtual time based only on that VM’s execution. To
mitigate network side channels, each VM is replicated 3×, the
replicas are co-located with different guests, and each interrupt
is delivered at a virtual time that is the median of the 3 times.
This prevents a guest from consistently observing I/O interfer-
ence with any co-located tenant. However, it also requires a
3× increase in employed Cloud resources. In contrast, Pacer
mitigates network side-channel leaks with far less resource
overhead. Deterland [68] also replaces VMs’ real time with
virtual time, but it does not address leaks due to network side
channels as it delivers I/O events to VMs without delay.
Bilal et al. [10] address leaks via the pattern of queries
to different backend nodes in multi-tier stream-processing
applications in a Cloud, but they do not consider leaks due to
packet size and timing, which is what Pacer focuses on.
Metadata-privacy. Herd [38], Vuvuzela [60], and
Karaoke [37] provide metadata-privacy—they prevent infor-
mation about who is communicating to whom from leaking
into network side channels. This goal is fundamentally differ-
ent from Pacer’s goal of preventing server-side secrets from
leaking. However, these systems and Pacer share underlying
techniques such as the use of dummy packets to shape traffic.
Other work. Oblivious computing [21, 24, 43] prevents
accessed memory addresses or accessed database keys from
depending on secrets. Pacer addresses the orthogonal problem
of making packet size and timing independent of secrets.
Some prior work [51, 45, 17] uses techniques similar to
those used for network side channel mitigation to perfor-
mance isolate co-located tenants. Richter et al. [52] propose
to performance-isolate co-located tenants by modifying the
NIC firmware. Pacer’s traffic shaping can be similarly im-
plemented in the NIC. This would provide strong isolation
of the pacing logic from the rest of the system in the face of
micro-architectural side channels. Silo [33] implements traffic
pacing in the hypervisor like Pacer. However, Silo’s goal is to
improve remote access latency, not information security, and,
hence, its pacing logic is very different.
9. Conclusions
We presented and evaluated Pacer, a traffic-shaping tunnel
implementation for an IaaS Cloud. Pacer shapes tenant’s net-
work traffic to be independent of secrets, therefore thwarting
network side channels attacks by adversaries who can achieve
co-location in the same server, rack, or datacenter, or oth-
erwise observe victim’s traffic. Pacer reduces overhead by
allowing the tenant’s traffic shape to reveal non-secret aspects
of its workload. Experiments with video and document servers
show that Pacer can achieve a bandwidth cost that reflects the
tenant’s conditional traffic distribution given public parame-
ters and generally modest runtime overhead. Pacer’s design
can be generalized to cover client traffic, multi-tier systems,
and general VPNs, but the details remain as future work.
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